“This is a historic moment”, read the BNP website when it was revealed that almost one million citizens had decided to cast their vote for the party, in the process sending the first far right politicians in British history into the European Parliament. Watching newly-elected MEPs Nick Griffin and Andrew Brons – both veterans of the far right – receive the publicity they have long craved the words of author William Bolitho came to mind: “We will never have fascism in England; no Englishman will dress up, not even for a revolution”. Well, the BNP have donned their suits and whilst they may not have got a revolution they have achieved what no previous far right party ever could: an elected presence.
Prior to the election our research at the University of Manchester pointed toward significant potential for far right gains, with growing sections of the British electorate sympathetic to the BNP’s arguments and disaffected with the mainstream political parties Our analysis of public opinion revealed that the party was winning over support in Labour strongholds, particularly in Yorkshire and the North. The 2009 European election results confirmed this trend, with the BNP winning double digit shares in a range of declining Northern industrial towns such as Barnsley, Burnley and Doncaster. The BNP seem to be hurting Labour most: in local authorities where the BNP scored under 5%, Labour’s vote fell five points from 2004; where the BNP scored more than 10% Labour dropped nine points. Yet overall the BNP’s gains were modest given the exceptionally favourable environment: compared with 2004 the party’s overall share of the vote increased by only 1.3 per cent The BNP’s failed to take full advantage of economic recession, public concern over immigration and the expenses crisis, and were soundly beaten nationwide by UKIP, who rode these trends to an unprecedented second place, ahead of the Labour government. In local elections the party emerged with only three county councillors from the over 400 candidates who stood. So what does all of this mean for British politics?
First, in the short-term the result will strengthen the leadership of Nick Griffin and dampen discontent inside the party. Recent months have seen dissatisfaction among some activists over the absence of intra-party democracy, lack of professionalism and – for more moderate followers – Griffin’s refusal to budge on the ‘Whites only’ membership policy. Representation in Europe and the accompanying spoils of office will pull activists from breakaway far right groups back into the BNP fold, cementing the party’s hegemony on the far right. It will also silence Griffin’s critics within the party, as the long promised payoffs to Griffin’s strategy start to arrive.
Second, following the example of UKIP, Griffin will seek to channel new funding back into organizational development. Even before the election of MEPs the BNP’s campaign resources were unprecedented for a British far right party; relentless door-to-door canvassing, call centres, new administrative structures, the use of business consultants and an aggressive online campaigning strategy all underscore the professionalization of the Griffin’s BNP, a process that will now acquire further momentum. Third, the result will considerably strengthen transnational links between the BNP and its continental counterparts such as Jobbik in Hungary (who picked up three MEPs), and who Griffin visited prior to election day. Despite his portrayal in the British media as a ranting führer-wannabe Griffin is taken seriously within the European far right scene and a European presence will enable the BNP to exchange resources, experience and ideas with similar parties elsewhere.
Fourthly, following its ‘ladder strategy’ – which prioritizes success in local and European contests as a means to achieve a wider national breakthrough – the forthcoming general election will almost certainly see BNP strategists turn their guns with renewed vigour toward Labour’s industrial heartlands. We now know that the BNP performs strongest in economically deprived areas that have – or are close to – large Muslim communities and where there are large numbers of less skilled and less educated working class males (in other words, traditional Labour Party supporters). The BNP will have been emboldened by their ability to make gains at Labour’s expense, will take comfort from the fact that UKIP have no ‘ground game’ and seldom perform as well in national elections, and so the party will look toward constituencies such as Barking (where they polled 17% in 2005), Burnley, Dagenham, Dewsbury, Dudley North and those around Stoke-on-Trent as prospective sites for a second place finish or, quite possibly, the election of the first BNP Member of Parliament. Griffin will seek to learn from the mistakes of the earlier National Front (NF), which in the general election of 1979 got ahead of itself by standing over 300 candidates (polling a meagre 1.3 per cent). The BNP are more likely to run a smaller but more targeted campaign focusing on areas where they know they will do well, and drafting in footsoldiers from other areas in an attempt to exploit Labour’s disarray at the grassroots.
Fifth, the party has learnt that it does not need to talk about race and immigration to make gains. Though concern over immigration remains a key driver of BNP support the party itself downplayed overt racism and discussion of immigration gave way to calls for economic nationalism and an anti-establishment ‘punish the pigs’ theme. The party will continue this attempt to shed its single-issue status, most likely by targeting MPs damaged by the expenses fiasco and promoting economic nationalism in deindustrializing areas that are struggling with recession. Sixth, the BNP gains raise fundamental questions about how best to respond to the party’s rise. The BNP’s success came despite prominent efforts by all the mainstream parties, and many newspapers, to cast the party as socially and politically unacceptable. The traditional tactic of shouting ‘Nazi scum’ is no longer effective (if it ever was) and may even be counter-productive, by adding plausibility to Griffin’s claims that his party is an outsider denied a legitimate voice by the conspiracies of the mainstream elite. A more sophisticated strategy is needed to win back voters who both agree with the BNP’s policy proposals and have lost all faith in what the mainstream parties have to offer.
